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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MURRAY FIRST THRIFT & LOAN
CO. , a corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

)
)
)
)

JOHN V. BENSON and EMILY SUE
BENSON,
Defendants,

)
*

)

and

Case No. 5380

)

MURRAY FIRST THRIFT & LOAN
CO., a corporation,
Third-Party
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)

GEORGE P. RUFF,

)

Third-Party
Defendant-Respondent.

)
)

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
MURRAY FIRST THRIFT & LOAN CO,

Murray First Thrift & Loan Co. (hereinafter "Murray"),
appellant herein, responds as follows to the Brief of George
P. Ruff (hereinafter "Ruff"), respondent herein.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent has not taken essential issue with the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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statement of the case set forth in appellant's opening
Brief:

That the instant action was brought by Murray

against John V. and Emily Sue Benson (hereinafter "Bensons11)
to collect on various notes and to foreclose on various
mortgages given to it by Bensons and that Bensons, by way
of both of defenses and counterclaim, asserted that they
were excused from liability to Murray by reason of various
negligent and/or wrongful acts of Ruff, the loan officer
who had processed Murray's loan to them (i.e., lack of
documentation of loans, forgery, fraudulent inducement of
loans and failure to credit Bensons payment to their accounts).
It further appeared from discovery that Ruff had breached his
duty to Murray to obtain sufficient collateral for the Bensons
loans and to keep accurate records and accounts of the sums
disbursed to Bensons.

Upon discovering Bensons defenses and

questionable ability, Murray filed a third-party complaint
against Ruff for indemnification of any judgment which Benson
might obtain against it and for recovery of principal and
interest on any loans which Murray might be unable to recover
from Bensons (either by means of their successful defense or
inability to respond) as a result of Ruff's wrongful acts.
Appellant's Brief, pp. 1-4.

Indeed, respondent does not dis-

pute Murray's characterization of the case as one in which
only two conclusions were possible:

Recovery by Murray from

Bensons or from Ruff - "Murray's third-party claim [against Ruff],
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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therefore, supplemented its claim against Bensons and . . .
could not be evaluated divorced from Murray's claims against
Bensons.11

Id. , p.4.

The action was settled on the day of trial by
Bensons agreeing to transfer certain real property - which
represented the great majority of their total assets - to
Murray.

At the moment the settlement was concluded, it was

impossible to determine whether Murray had been made whole
by that settlement; that could be determined only after the
property had been liquidated.

Murray therefore moved the

Court that its claims against Ruff be dismissed without prejudice because "[Murray] will not know until we have liquidated
the Benson property, whether and to what extent Murray has
been injured by the apparent defalcation of Mr. Ruff."
9, 1976 Proceedings, P. 33.

March

Respondent's only answer to that

motion was the unverified and unsubstantiated statement by
Mr. Cassity, his attorney, that "I have almost unbelievable
expense" and that - in some way which Mr. Cassity did not disclose - Ruff would be prejudiced if the case was not tried
immeidately.

Id., pp. 33-34.

There is no dispute as to the following:
1.

Bensons last-minute decision to settle made it

impossible to determine, at the time set for trial, whether
Murray would need, or would be entitled to, additional recovery from Ruff in order to be made whole.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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2.

The cost of a potentially unnecessary trial to

Murray - and, for that matter, to all concerned - would be
substantial.
3.

If, after liquidation of the Benson settlement,

Murray had been permitted to proceed by a new action against
Ruff, all discovery previously taken could have been used in
the later case (UTAH R. CIV. p. 32(a)(4)) and only additional
expense which Ruff would have incurred as a result of the
,!

false start11 on the date originally set for trial would have

been the costs incurred by his counsel's appearance in St.
George and incidental expenses - which easily could have been
reimbursed to him as a condition of re-filing, if the Court
had deemed that appropriate.
4.

Neither Ruff nor his attorney offered any evi-

dence to the trial court that Ruff would be prejudiced or discommoded in any way (other than that described above) by a
dismissal without prejudice.

As a practical matter, the effect

upon Ruff of a dismissal without prejudice would have differed
little from that of a change in trial setting; the case against
him simply would have come forward at a later date.
•

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING MURRAY'S
MOTION FOR DISMISSAL WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
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The question presented by this case is stated as
follows:

May a court properly deny a motion for dismissal

without prejudice when a new development (in this instance,
the Bensons settlement) creates a substantial likelihood that
the action will be rendered moot and the only potential prejudice to the opposing party consists of obviously reimbursable
expenditures?
The above question, which never has been put to this
Court, was squarely presented in Alamance Industries, Inc. v.
Filene's, 291 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1961).

In that case, a patent

infringement action, the pending controversy appeared headed
for resolution as part of a broader action pending in another
judicial district.

Plaintiff moved for dismissal without

prejudice which the trial judge denied.

The judge's view of

the matter was:
"...When you come here, you come here to a
judge that disposes of business promptly for
the public interest regardless of the private
interests. I am not going to have a case I donft care what any other judge has - which
lasts on my docket an inexcusably long period
of time.... You have gotten the defendant to
spend money to get a lawyer.11
Id. at 144.

The Court of Appeals found the trial court to

have abused its discretion:
Apparently what principally lay behind the
district court's determination to try the case
is to be found in its remark, made at the first
hearing, that the "public interest11 of not having
a case lie on its docket for fourteen months must
control "regardless of private interests.ff We
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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cannot accept this statement either as
the formulation of a generally applicable
principle or as a proper criterion for the
disposition of this particular case. Courts
exist to serve the parties, and not to serve
themselves, or to present a record with respect to dispatch of business. Complaints
heard as to the law's delays arise because
the delay has injured litigants, not the
courts. For the court to consider expedition for its own sake "regardless" of the
litigants is to emphasize secondary considerations over primary.
...Nothing was to be gained by a ...
trial...which could have been entirely
obviated....
...Whether, and on what terms, a dismissal without prejudice may be granted, is
a matter left initially to the trial court's
discretion. [Citations omitted.] but that
does not excuse the failure to exercise any
discretion [Citations omitted.] or save from
reversal an unpermitted exercise. We have
already expressed our belief that the court
did not even purport to exercise discretion.
But were we to assume that it did, the reasons
given - that [plaintiff] had brought the suit,
and obliged the defendant to employ counsel
to file an answer - were patently insufficient.
These were merely a recitation of the very circumstances that call the rule into play. Something else was needed, and we find nothing else
present. By the dismissal offered [defendant]
would be protected [by curative conditions].
Id. at 146-147.

(Emphasis added.)

The instant case is closely analogous to Alamance
there appears to be no case even remotely analogous to this
one which supplies a contrary result.
Respondent has offered no authority - nor, indeed,
any reason - which could justify the trial court's action.
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Respondent urges that this Court regard Butler v. Denton,
150 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1945) and Emmco Ins. Co. v. Walker,
57 N.M. 525, 260 P.2d 712 (1953) as supporting affirmance.
Respondents' Brief P.7.

However, no facts comparable to

those existing in Alamance or in the instant case were demonstrated in Butler and dismissal was ordered in Emmco on the
express finding that plaintiff had not diligently prepared
for trial.

260 P.2d at 714. Neither decision has any appli-

cation here.
At page 7 of the Brief of Mr. Ruff, it is argued
that the trial court's denial of Murray's motion was by reason
of the

!f

[a]dvanced state of proceedings", citing Paturzo v.

Home L. Ins. Co., 503 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1974) and Shaffer v.
Evans, 263 F.2d 134 (10th Cir. 1958).

Br., p. 8.

Neither case is analogous to the present action.

In

Paturzo, the only reason apparently given for plaintiff's motion
to dismiss without prejudice was his desire to proceed by a
newly filed class action in which he had demanded a jury trial
(he had waived his right to jury trial in the pending action)
(503 F.2d at 335-336); in Schaffer, the Court of Appeals
found that "no reason prejudicial to [plaintiff's] substantive
rights was suggested" in support of the motion for dismissal
without prejudice.

263 F.2d at L35.

Plaintiff appears to cite the cases of Cincinnati

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Traction Co. v. Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co., 25 F. Supp.

*

322 (D. Del. 1938) and Roth v. Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co.,
5 FED. R. SERV. 41 (S.D. Ohio 1942) as somehow justifying
the trial court's action by reason of Ruff's purported
expenses incurred to date.

Br., p. 9.

In fact, the court

in Cincinnati Traction denied plaintiff's motion for leave to
amend on the ground that no need whatever had been demonstrated for dismissal without prejudice; the District Court
deciding Roth, which apparently believed that it could impose
4
no curative conditions beyond "a few dollars by way of costs",
simply misunderstood its powers to fashion appropriate conditions to a dismissal without prejudice.

Respondent also urges,
4

at page 10 of the Brief, in reliance upon Golconda Petroleum
Corp. v. Petrol Corp., 46 F.Supp. 23 (S.D. Cal. 1942), that a
dismissal without prejudice would damage Ruff by delaying a
final resolution of this controversy.

However, no such pre-

judicial injury to Ruff was urged or demonstrated to the trial
court.

Indeed, Mr. Ruff is a defendant or third-party defen-

dant in two much larger actions arising from wrongdoing in his
employment with Murray and had pled guilty to filing charges
in connection therewith.

The effect of a one man lawsuit against

^

this admitted felon hardly could prejudice him substantially.
The balance of respondent's Brief (pp. 11-15) is more
oratory than a discussion of applicable legal authorities.

He

urges at pp. 11-12, that the fact that appellant did not propose
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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*

specific curative conditions to the trial court (which
indicated no interest in such conditions) somehow excused
the court from considering such conditions and exercising
its discretion in the matter is devoid of any support in
reported cases. Respondent's final argument, at pp. 12-15,
that a motion for dismissal without prejudice in order to
prevent a rather lengthy trial for damages which might have
been rendered moot by the Bensons settlement would be "not
sufficiently compelling" to justify the trial court's indulgence simply does not make sense.

It is difficult to imagine

a more "compelling" reason for dismissal without prejudice.
Thus avoidance of superfluous litigations.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the decisions of
the Court below should be reversed and remanded for dismissal
without prejudice.
Submitted this /y'^day of March, 1977.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

Licarc
John A. Snow
Attorneys for Appellant
141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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